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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FLORIDA'S VAGRANCY STATUTES
ROUND TWO

-

State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975)
The defendants, in separate incidents, were arrested pursuant to Florida's
recently enacted loitering statute.' Two defendants were convicted,2 but proceedings against the two other defendants were dismissed on the ground
that the loitering statute was unconstitutional.3 All four actions were consolidated for appeal to the Florida supreme court, 4 which HELD, Florida's
loitering statute is constitutional 5 and a proper law enforcement tool to
1.

FLA. STAT.

§856.021 (1973) provides:

"'Loiteringor prowling; penalty (1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time or in a
manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant a
justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property
in the vicinity.
(2) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such
alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight upon
appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless flight by the person or other circumstances
make it impracticable, a law enforcement officer shall prior to any arrest for an offense
tinder this section, afford the person an opportunity to dispel an) alarm or immediate
concern which would otherwise be warranted by requesting him to identify himself and
explain his presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this
section if the law enforcement officer did not comply with this procedure or if it appears
at trial that the explanation given by the person is true, and, if believed by the officer at
the time, would have dispelled the alarm or immediate concern.
(3) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
of the second degree, punishable as provided in §775.082 or §775.083."
2. In one of the consolidated cases, Bell v. State, the defendant Bell was hiding among
the bushes at a private home at 1:20 a.m. and fled the scene on the approach of an officer.
The officer, however, apprehended him and placed him tinder arrest. State v. Ecker, 311
So. 2d 104, 110-11 (Fla. 1975). In Worth v. State, defendant Worth was stopped by three
citizens in a warehouse at 9:50 p.m. The citizens did not testify to the incident, and all
that existed was an inference that the defendant had been in the area to strip a car.
Id. at 111.
3. The defendant Ecker was observed in front of an apartment building and lacked
credible identification when approached by an officer. 311 So. 2d at 111. The facts of the
fourth case, State v. Harris, were omitted from the opinion.
4. Jurisdiction was pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, §3(b)(1), which gives the Florida
supreme court the authority to hear appeals from orders of trial courts directly passing on
the validity of a state statute.
5. 311 So. 2d at 104. The Florida supreme court found that defendant Bell's hiding
on private property would cause a reasonable man to be concerned for his safety or
property. The court also noted that the defendant attempted to flee upon the officer's
approach and could not give an acceptable explanation for his behavior. From these
facts, the court concluded that the elements of the crime had been met and affirmed
the trial court's decision. 311 So. 2d at 111.
The Florida supreme court stating that the circumstances in defendant Worth's case
(lid not indicate a threat to public safety, reversed the trial court's decision on a finding
that the elements of the crime had not been properly established. Id. In defendant Ecker's
case, the court reversed the trial court's holding that FLA. STAT. §856.021 was unconstitutional yet affirmed the discharge of the defendant after finding no circumstances in the
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protect the public safety. 6
Although similar crimes existed in ancient Athens and China, 7 American
vagrancy and loitering statutes are based on early English law.8 In the
fourteenth century, Parliament enacted England's first vagrancy statute, the
Statute of Labourers, 9 in an attempt to halt economic instability resulting
from the breakdown of feudalism. 10 The statute specifically tied the laboring
population to the land, regulating wages and punishing those who "wandered."" Gradually, the vagrant became recognized as a "probable criminal,"' 2
however, and the basis for these statutes changed from economic necessity to
3
public protection.
Florida adopted the English vagrancy concept in 1824 with the passage
of its first vagrancy statute. 14 Only five years ago, the state reaffirmed its
adherence to early English law by enacting a -vagrancy statute 5 based on
complaint suggesting that the defendant had threatened public safety. Id. In the fourth
of the consolidated cases, the Florida supreme court again reversed a trial court decision
that the statute was unconstitutional, and, finding that the record failed to include the
complaint against defendant Harris, remanded the case to the trial court. Id.
6. 311 So. 2d at 106. Justice Ervin dissented and Justice Boyd concurred with the dissent.

Id. at 111-12; see note 74 infra and accompanying text. The Florida supreme court upheld
the statute but subjected it to certain conditions and limitations. See text accompanying
notes 36-39, 47-49 infra. See also Brown v. State, 310 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1975) where, in a
per curiam decision, the Florida supreme court reaffirmed the constitutionality of FLA.
STAT. §856.021 four months after the decision in the instant case.
7. 5 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169. In ancient Athens idleness per se was a
punishable offense. Id.
8. E.g., Act of June 20, 1723, in LAws oF VA., Sup. TO HENING'S STAT. AT LARGE 253
(1971).
9. 23 Edw. 3, c. 1; 25 Edw. 3, c. 1; see 3 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 203-05 (1883). For a discussion of English acts, see 4 W. HoLuswoRTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 387-402 (3d ed. 1945); 10 W. HOLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
177-80 (1938).
10. 2 W. HOLDsWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 459-64 (4th ed. 1936). The decline
of feudalism was hastened by the Black Death of 1349, which wiped out nearly half of the

population. The tremendous shortage of labor that resulted placed workers in a position
to demand great increases in wages. Id. See also Westley, The Vagrant and the Law, 12 THE
GREEN BAG 330 (1900). The term vagrant arose because the laborers wandered around in
search of the best market in which to sell their services. See generally J. STEPHEN, supra
note 9, at 267; Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. Riv. 603
(1956); Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 237 (1958); Note, Vagrancy Concept
Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102, 104-07 (1962).
11. 23 Edw. 3, c. 1; 25 Edw. 3, c. 1. See J. STEPHEN, supra note 9, at 267. The punishment for noncompliance was imprisonment. The statute thus made "wandering or vagrancy
-..
a crime." Id.
12. J. STEPHEN, supra note 9, at 274.
13. The "Slavery Act," 1 Edw. 6, c. 3, shows the change in emphasis from the vagrant
as merely a nonproductive citizen to the vagrant as a potential criminal. The Act's text
begins: "For as much as idleness and vagabondry is the mother and root of all thefts,
robberies, and all evil acts and other mischiefs ....
" (spelling modernized). 1 Edw. 6, c. 3,
§1. See also 25 Geo. 2, c. 36 §12; Note, Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and
Abuses of Status Criminalty, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
102, 105-06 (1962); Note, Vagrancy - A
Study in Constitutional Obsolescence, 22 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 384, 389-90 (1970).
14. Fla. Laws 1824, Act of Dec. 28, 1824, §90, at 347.
15. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-132, §17A at 393 (former Fla. Stat. §856.02) provided:
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a sixteenth century mode.16 Although similar statutes in other jurisdictions
have existed for hundreds of years with only occasional constitutional attacks, 17 the 1970's brought a significant increase in cases challenging the
statutes as being unconstitutionally vague.' The United States Supreme Court
has required that criminal statutes be clear and precise on their face' 9 in
order to give fair notice of conduct subject to penalty, 20 and has held that
failure to meet the notice requirement constitutes a denial of due process. 21 In
demanding certainty in criminal statutes, the Court stated: "There must be
ascertainable standards of guilt. Men of common intelligence can not be re' ' 22
quired to guess at the meaning of the enactment.
"Vagrants. - Rogues and vagabonds, idle or dissolute persons who go about begging,
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common pipers
and fiddlers, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers, traders in stolen property, lewd,
wanton, and lascivious persons who neglect their calling or employment, or are without
reasonably continuous employment or regular income and who have not sufficient propert)
to sustain them and misspend what they earn without providing for themselves or the
support of their families, persons wandering or strolling around front place to place without
any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, idle and disorderly persons, persons frequenting houses of ill fame or gamblinghouses, persons able to work but habitually living
upon the earnings of their wives or minor children, and all able bodied male persons
over the age of eighteen years who are without means of support and remain in idleness,
shall be deemed vagrants, and upon conviction shall be subject to penalty provided in
§856.03." The statute was repealed by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-133, §3, at 416. See Comment,
Constitutional Law: The Belated Demise of a Vagrancy Statute, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 227
(1972), for a discussion of this statute and its invalidation.
16. See Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds - Old Concepts in Need of Revision,

48

CALIF.

L. RE-. 557, 560-61 (1960). The author suggests that former

FLA.

STAT.

§856.02

was "selected more or less at random" from the Statute of Elizabeth, 39 Eliz. 1, c. 4,
which defined in great detail the various classes of "Rogues, Vagabonds, and Sturdie
Beggers." Those fitting the definitions were to be whipped and sent home or to their
last place of residence, there to be put to work. See 10 W. HOLDSWORTH 177-78 (4th ed.
1936). Recidivists faced added penalties ranging tip to banishment or death. 39 Eliz. 1, c. 4.
See Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1967), where Justice Ervin, dissenting in part,
stated: "[T]he statute because of its historical derivation, employs archaic language in
...ld. at 855.
its descriptions of vagrants.
17. Comment, ConstitutionalAttacks on Vagrancy Laws, 20 STAN. L. REv. 782, 783 (1968).
The statutes were not challenged because indigent vagrants were often unable to obtain
counsel for an appeal and had difficulty prosecuting appeals before their short terms
ended. Id.
18. See Arnold v. City of Denver, 171 Colo. 1, 464 P.2d 515 (1970); State v. Grahovac,
52 Hawaii 527, 480 P.2d 148 (1971); Hayes v. Municipal Court, 487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1971); City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 423 P.2d 522 (1967); State v. Starks,
51 Wis. 2d 256, 186 N.W.2d 245 (1971).
19. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (invalidated a New Jersey
vagrancy statute that punished persons who were members of a "gang"); Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (overturned an Oklahoma statute that contained a vague provision fixing hours of service and wages for labor).
20. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
21. E.g., Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
22. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948), quoting Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Defendant was convicted for having certain magazines in
his possession with intent to sell them in violation of a New York penal law. The Supreme
Court reversed the decision, holding the statute void for vagueness after determining
that the statute gave ineffective notice of what constituted the crime.
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In 1972, the Court, in Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,23 applied the
due process notice requirement to a Jacksonville ordinance identical to
Florida's former vagrancy statute 4 and concluded that the wording was
vague on its face.25 A unanimous Court 29 found the terms contained in
the ordinance, and hence the statute, too general and all-inclusive.2 7 This
28
infirmity, the Court concluded, encouraged "arbitrary and erratic arrests"
29
and imposed criminal penalties on innocent acts. While the Supreme Court
invalidated the ordinance on constitutional grounds, it failed to set any
guidelines for drafting a vagrancy law that would meet the due process
requirement.
In an effort to conform state law to the Papachristoudecision, the Florida
Legislature replaced the old statute with the statute at issue in the instant
case.30 The lawmakers abandoned entirely the language of the invalidated
statute and structured the new loitering law after a provision in the Model
Penal Code,2 ' which had been endorsed in dicta by other state appellate
32
courts upon the invalidation of earlier vagrancy laws.
The instant court, viewing the provisions of the new loitering statute,
construed the elements of the offense as requiring proof that:

23. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
24.

JACKSONVILLE,

FLA. CODE §26-57 (1965). This ordinance was substantially similar to

Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-132, §17A, at 393, discussed in notes 15-16 supra.
25. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-132, §17A, at 393, had been held unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad by a three-judge federal district court in Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp.
266 (S.D. Fla. 1969), vacated on other grounds sub nor., Shevin v. Lazarus, 401 U.S. 987
(1971). The decision was held not to be binding on the state courts in Brown v. City of
Jacksonville, 236 So. 2d 141, 142 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970). The statute had been held constitutional by the Florida supreme court in Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1967), reaffirmed in Smith v. State, 239 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1970). In Smith v. Florida, 405 U.S. 172
(1972), the United States Supreme Court reviewed the decision on the same day as
Papachristouand vacated and remanded it for consideration consistent with the Papachristou
decision.
26. Justices Rehnquist and Powell took no part in the consideration of the Papachristou
decision.
27. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166 (1972).
28. Id. at 162. The Court further noted that it placed "unfettered discretion" in the
hands of the police. Id. at 168.
29. Id. at 163.
30. See notes 1, 15 supra for the texts of the two statutes.
31. MODEL PENAL CODE §250.6 ( Proposed Draft, 1962) was promulgated by the American
Law Institute to cure the defects in earlier vagrancy laws. For a discussion of an earlier but
substantially similar draft see MODEL PENAL CODE §250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961); Note,
A New Approach to Old Crimes: The Model Penal Code, 39 NOTRE DAME LAw. 310, 330-33
(1964). There are several small differences in wording between the Model Penal Code and
FI.A. STAT. §856.021 (1973), but the differences are not relevant to this discussion.
32. People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 573, 300 N.E.2d 411, 415, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, 39 (1973),
wherein the court remarked that it was a far more specific and tightly drawn provision
than the previous draft (MODEL PENAL CODE, §250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961)); Seattle
v.Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 412, 423 P.2d 522, 526 (1967), wherein the Model Penal Code
was described as the best comment setting guidelines for loitering legislation; State v.
Starks, 51 Wis. 2d 256, 265, 186 N.W,2d 945, 250 (1971), wherein the court noted that
other courts have voiced approval,
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(1) the defendant loitered or prowled in a place, at a time, or in a
manner not usual for law-abiding individuals;
(2) such loitering and prowling were under circumstances that warranted a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for
the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. The alarm is prethe defendant
sumed under the statute if, when a law officer appears,
33
flees, conceals himself, or refuses to identify himself.
The provisions of the statute were constitutionally challenged by each defendant on the grounds that they were vague and overbroad, required selfincrimination, 3 4 and were subject to arbitrary application. 35 While recognizing
the recent trend toward invalidation of such vagrancy laws, the Florida court
upheld the statute after weighing the individual's right of personal freedom
against the societal need to be protected from imminent criminal danger. 36
The Florida supreme court responded first to the vagueness and overbreadth challenge and held that the words "under circumstances that warrant
a justifiable and reasonable alarm for the safety of persons or property in the
vicinity" in the statute mean "those circumstances where peace and order
' 37
are threatened or where the safety of persons or property is jeopardized."
The court further asserted that if a statute proscribes loitering that threatens
public safety or breach of the peace, "it can withstand constitutional attack. ' ' 3
Six cases were cited by the court in support of this assertion. 39
The court supplemented its reply to the vagueness attack by discounting
City of Portland v. White,40 a recent Oregon Court of Appeals decision

striking down an ordinance 4 1 based on the same provisions of the Model Penal
Code. In attacking the decision in White, the Florida court stated that the
Oregon court had failed to properly apply the judicial principle of construing
the wishes of the legislative body in a manner that would make the legisla-

33. 311 So. 2d at 106.
34. Id. at 109-10. The appellants constitutionally challenged the statute because it required
an accused "to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct." Id. at 109. In finding
no constitutional violation in circumstances where public safety is threatened, the court
cited California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971). In that case, the United States Supreme
Court held that the possibility of incrimination is insufficient by itself and the "disclosure
of name and address is essentially a neutral act." Id. at 432.
35. Id. at 107-09.
36. Id. at 107.
37. Id. at 109.
38. Id. at 107.
39. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1044 (1970); People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867
(Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); City of Detroit v. Ritchey, 25 Mich.
App. 98, 181 N.W.2d 87 (1970); Camarco v. City of Orange, 61 N.J. 463, 295 A.2d 353
(1972). See notes 54-59 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the six cases.
40. City of Portland v. White, 9 Ore. App. 239, 495 P.2d 778 (1972); see Comment, 51
ORE. L. REV. 624 (1972) for a discussion of the case.
41. 9 Ore. at 240, 495 P.2d at 778-79, quoting PORTLAND, ORE., POLICE CODE § 14.92.045.
\ predecessor statute was invalidated in City of Portland v. James, 251 Ore. 8, 9, 444 P.2d
554, 554-55 (1968), quoting PORTLAND, ORE.,

POLICE
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tion constitutional.4 2 The Oregon court, however, professed to consider the
principle43 but nevertheless found the statute impermissibly vague. In considering the first element of the offense, 4 the Oregon court decided that the
words "loiter" and "prowl," standing alone, were too "elastic" to give fair
notice of what conduct was unlawful. 45 The court did not believe that the
two terms were made definite by the modifying phrase "in a place, at a time
or in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens." 46 In addition, the Oregon
court struck down the second requirement of the ordinance - loitering that
warranted reasonable alarm or concern for the safety of persons or property finding the requirement indistinguishable from a provision previously in47
validated in an earlier Portland ordinance.
The court in the instant case concluded its justification for rejecting the
vagueness challenge by combining language from Terry v. Ohio,48 a "stop and
frisk" case, with its interpretation of the new Florida statute:
"[T]he police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
is imminent
reasonably warrant" a finding that a breach of the
4 9 peace
or the public or the public safety is threatened.
In responding to the arbitrary application challenge, the court held that
the statute does not authorize the police officers to use "unbridled discretion,"
but can only be applied when the surrounding circumstances would suggest
to a reasonable man that some threat to public safety exists. 50 The court attempted to narrow further the construction and thus avoid the arbitrary application attack by requiring that the "separate, distinct elements of the
offense be established in the same manner as those of any other criminal
offense." 5' Significantly the court, applying these elements cautiously, held
that only one of the four cases before it satisfied its standards for application
52
of the statute.
Unfortunately, the precedential value of the cases relied on by the court
in declaring Florida's loitering statute constitutional appears questionable.
42.
43.
44.
45.

311 So. 2d at 109.
City of Portland v. White, 9 Ore. App. 239, 242, 495 P.2d 778, 779 (1972).
See text accompanying note 33 supra for the elements of the offense.
9 Ore. App. at 242, 495 P.2d at 779.

46. Id.

47. Id. at 243; 495 P.2d at 780. The previously invalidated ordinance allowed an
officer to arrest when conduct suggested to him that the suspect had an unlawful purpose,
but the Oregon statute in question permitted an officer to arrest when there was "justifiable
alarm." The court concluded that both statutes allowed the officer to arrest "when the
officer believes the suspect is about to commit a crime."
48. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court held that police have the power to "stop and frisk"
a person if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is armed. If the frisk gives rise
to probable cause that the suspect has committed a crime, the police are empowered to
make an arrest.
49. 311 So. 2d at 109, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
50. Id. at 110.
51. Id. at 111.
52. Id. at 110-11. See note 5 supra.
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Only one of the six cases cited,53 People v. Solomon, 64 was analagous to the
instant decision, and it is questionable whether that case, a California appellate court decision, merits such reliance. Another case, Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, was not concerned with a loitering statute, 55 and three decisions
dealt with narrower statutes that required the commission of a more closelydefined act - loitering that obstructed the passage of pedestrians on public
walkways.5 6 Furthermore, two of these cases 57 involved statutes requiring a
warning by police officers before a charge could be made. It is apparent that
these three statutes gave adequate notice of what conduct could be subjected to penalty. In United States v. Cassiagnol,5 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a General
Services Administration regulation prohibiting disorderly conduct and unwarranted loitering or assembly on federal property. In that case, the court
specifically held that the statute only applied to conduct on government
property. The case can be further distinguished because the federal court
held that the government had a special interest in prohibiting conduct that
is "intended to and does interfere with, delay, or impede the normal . . .
conduct" of government business on federal property. 59
In further attempts to defeat the vagueness attack, the Florida supreme
53. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
54. 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 951 (1974). Many similarities exist between the California decision and the instant
case: (1) Both cases interpreted similar statutes. Penal code §647(e) declares a street loiterer
guilty of disorderly conduct if he refuses to identify himself and account for his presence
on the request of a police officer "if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to
a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification." Id. at 431, 108 Cal.
Rptr. at 868. (2) Both courts applied the same standards to their respective statutes the Terry v. Ohio and reasonable man standards. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
(3) In responding to alleged arbitrariness, both state courts strictly construed the elements
of the offenses and required proof of each element in the statutes to establish the offense.
33 Cal. App. 3d at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
55. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the United States Supreme
Court upheld the validity of an offensive conduct statute after narrowing its provisions to
prohibit only offensive words that tend to excite the addressee to "acts of violence."
56. In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965), the United States Supreme Court upheld an Alabama statute that made it an offense to loiter so as to obstruct
the free passage of pedestrians along a public walkway. (The statute had been narrowly
construed by the Alabama Court of Appeals to also require a showing of the accused's
blocking free passage.) In Detroit v. Ritchey, 25 Mich. App. 98, 181 N.W.2d 87 (1970), the
Court of Appeals of Michigan upheld a statute prohibiting loitering activity that obstructs
the passage of pedestrians. In Camarco v. City of Orange, 61 N.J. 463, 295 A.2d 353 (1972).
the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld a statute making loitering that produces the
sort of immediate physical reaction that poses a threat to public peace or safety an unlawful
act. The statute also prohibited loitering that obstructs the free passage of pedestrians or
vehicles and loitering that obstructs, molests, or interferes with people lawfully in a public
place. This statute also contained a provision that required a refusal to obey a police
officer's order to move on before an arrest was valid.
57. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Camarco v. City of Orange, 61
N.J. 463, 295 A.2d 353 (1972).
58. 420 F.2d 868 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1044 (1970).
59. Id. at 873.
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court adopted language from Terry v. Ohio6o to establish guidelines for
police in making arrests pursuant to the statute. The United States Supreme
Court in Terry, however, sanctioned an external search of the person before
a possible arrest; 1 the Florida law authorizes arrest. Clearly, the arrest permitted by the loitering statute imposes, with less justification, a significantly
greater intrusion on personal freedom than does an external search. The external search in Terry was sanctioned in order to protect police from assault
with a concealed weapon. 62 In contrast, the new Florida statute was promulgated purely as a "public safety tool." 63 More important, a search, unlike an
ordinary arrest, can occur in the absence of probable cause.6 4 On the basis
of these distinctions, it is difficult to justify the application of the standards
established in Terry to Florida's loitering statute.
In responding to the final challenge - arbitrary application of the statute
- the court applied a "reasonable man" standard to establish the elements
of the criminal offense. 65 Although this may appear to be contrary to the
requirement of probable cause, "reasonable cause"66 and "reasonable
grounds"67 have been held to be substantial equivalents. The Oregon court,
in City of Portland v. White, however, pointed out that if a suspect's conduct is such that an officer has probable cause to arrest, then an arrest can
68
be properly made for the specific offense and no loitering statute is needed.
The Florida court also failed to draw a distinction between the invalidated Jacksonville ordinance, 69 which permitted an officer to arrest a suspect
when the suspect's conduct suggested that he had an "unlawful purpose," and
the new Florida statute, which permits an officer to arrest a person "when
surrounding circumstances indicate to a reasonable man some threat and
concern for public safety."' 70 In both instances, the officer might reasonably
believe the suspect is about to commit a crime when in reality the suspect is
pursuing an innocent course. Significantly, the PapachristouCourt found the
"unlawful purpose" clause to be a "trap for innocent acts." 7'
The instant court disregarded the recent trend toward invalidating

60. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
61. Id. at 30.
62. Id. at 25; accord, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). In addition,
the search in Terry was justified as a means of providing more "effective crime prevention
and detection." 392 U.S. at 22.
63. 311 So. 2d at 106.
64. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
65. 311 So. 2d at 110.
66. United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639, 645 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
67. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 (1959).
68. Portland v. White, 9 Ore. App. 239, 243, 495 P.2d 778, 780 (1972). The court
gave attempted burglary as an example.
69. See note 15 supra and text accompanying note 33 supra.
70. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
71. Id. The Court underlined this by quoting from United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
214, 221 (1875): "It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say
who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large." 405 U.S. at 165.
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